Homeland Security News 国土安全部新闻

Below are excerpts from testimony of Dr. Jim Walsh, Research Associate , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at the hearing of the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.下面是摘录的证词吉姆沃尔什博士，副研究员，麻省理工学院，在听证会上对美国参议院委员会的国土安全和政府事务。

Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program 评估伊朗核计划

First, construction of centrifuges continues.首先，建造离心机仍在继续。 The IAEA recently estimated that Iran has somewhat over 3,000 centrifuges, and the government has announced plans to build 6,000 more.国际原子能机构最近的估计，伊朗已经有点超过3000离心机，政府已经宣布计划建立6000多。

Second, Iran has yet to demonstrate that it can run a system of centrifuge cascades at full capacity for an extended period of time.其次，伊朗尚未证明它可以运行系统的离心级联充分的能力在较长的时间。 More specifically, it is unclear if Iran can operate fragile centrifuges fed with Iranian-produced nuclear fuel without a major or even catastrophic breakdown.具体地说，目前还不清楚，如果伊朗能够脆弱的离心机喂伊朗生产核燃料，没有出现大的甚至灾难性的崩溃。

Third, there is an ongoing mix of achievement, technical problems, and bravado.第三，是一个持续不断的组合成就，技术问题，和虚张声势。 It is Iran’s interest to claim success in the field of enrichment, to create facts on the ground, to make enrichment a fait accompli.这是伊朗的利益要求的成功领域的活动，向当地造成既成事实，使活动成为既成事实。 Grand announcements have not always been followed by grand accomplishments.大公告并不总是其次是大的成就。 Rumors of technical problems persist for a program that has had many ups and downs over the course of twenty years.传言的技术问题依然存在一个程序，有许多跌宕起伏的过程中二十年。 Nevertheless, Iran has made progress.尽管如此，伊朗已经取得了进展。 It has produced low enriched uranium on a very small scale.它生产的低浓缩铀的一个非常小的规模。 It has constructed thousands of centrifuges, and most recently it has inboduced a new centrifuge design, the IR-2, which is intended to get around some of the difficulties it had encountered with the Pakistani centrifuge design it procured from AQ Kahn.它建造了数以千计的离心机，最近它已inboduced一个新的离心机设计，红外- 2 ，其目的是绕过一些困难，但它遇到了同巴基斯坦离心机设计它采购卡迪尔卡恩。

As we look to the future, one should probably expect more of the same: big announcements, greater progress in construction than in operation, technical achievement combined with ongoing technical hurdles.当我们展望未来，我们应该期待可能更多的是相同的：大公告，取得更大的进展比施工作业，技术成果结合正在进行的技术障碍。 As it stands, Iran does not have an enrichment program that can be a reliable supplier of highly enriched uranium for a weapons program, but assuming present conditions, they should come increasingly close to that threshold over a period of years.这样，伊朗没有核计划，可以是一个可靠的供应商的高浓缩铀的核武器计划，但假设目前的条件下，他们应该越来越接近临界一个时期来。

What are Alternatives for the Near and Long-term? 什么是替代近远期？

Sanctions 制裁

Sanctions Have Not and Will Not Induce Iran to End Its Centrifuge Program.制裁也不会促使伊朗停止其离心机的计划。

Containment 遏制

The same is true for a policy of containment, balancing and reassurance.同样的遏制政策，平衡和保证。 A containment policy seeks to isolate Iran, while balancing and reassurance includes steps to counter the Islamic Republic by strengthening the capabilities of US allies in the Gulf and in the region more generally.遏制政策试图孤立伊朗，而平衡和保证措施，包括反伊斯兰共和国通过加强能力的美国的盟国在海湾地区和该地区的更普遍。 It might also involve making clear America’s commitment to protect our friends should Iran seek to cause trouble.这可能还涉及美国作出明确的承诺，以保护我们的朋友应该寻求伊朗制造麻烦。 In practical terms, containment means continuing to do what the US has been doing since 1979.就实际情况而言，遏制手段继续做美国一直在做自1979年以来。 Balancing and reassurance could involve increasing arms sales, stationing US troops, positioning US military assets, and verbal or written assurances from the US government describing how the US would react to potential Iranian provocations.平衡和保证可涉及增加对台军售，驻扎美国军队，美国军队进驻资产，并口头或书面保证，美国政府说明如何，美国将作出反应的潜力伊朗的挑衅。

Use of military force 使用武力

Unlike the policy alternatives discussed above, the use of military force would address the problem of Iran’s enrichment program.不同的政策选择上面所讨论的，使用武力将解决这一问题伊朗的铀浓缩计划。 The problem, of course, is that it would do so with limited effectiveness and at an unacceptable cost.当然问题是，它这样做有限的有效性和令人无法接受的代价。 A full discussion of the military option is not possible here, but it has been the subject of extensive and detailed discussion, and at least a couple of points are worth noting.充分讨论军事选择是不可能的，但它一直受到广泛而详细的讨论，至少有两点值得注意。

To begin with, the military option is redly a set of options across a continuum that runs from “limited” air strikes against known nuclear facilities up to and including attacks on leadership and strategic targets and the use of ground troops, followed by the removal of the Iran’s revolutionary government.首先，军事选择是redly一套办法在一个连续运行从“有限的”空中打击已知的核设施的行动，包括袭击的领导和战略目标以及使用地面部队，其次是取消伊朗革命政府。 Moving from option to option along this continuum involves a tradeoff.从选项，选择沿着这条连续涉及权衡。 More modest uses of force leave the Iranian regime with a full array of retaliatory capabilities that they could use in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.更为温和使用武力离开伊朗政权的一系列报复能力，他们可以利用在伊拉克，阿富汗和其他地区。 On the other hand, a larger scale use of force intended in part to attrit the Islamic Republic’s ability to retaliate, necessarily involves larger costs of other kinds: economic costs, a short-term but substantial spike in the price of oil, American casualties, an uproar in the Muslim world that would likely contribute to an increase in extremism and renewed opportunities for al Qaeda and its off-shoots - to name a few.另一方面，大规模的使用武力的意图，部分磨损伊斯兰共和国的能力报复，必然涉及到较大的费用其他种类：经济成本，短期内大幅度上升，但在石油价格，美国人员伤亡，引起一片哗然在穆斯林世界将可能有助于增加极端主义和新的机会，基地组织和它的外竹笋-仅举几例。 These costs would come-at a time when the US is already fighting two land wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and is engaged in a broad-based struggle against terrorism.这些费用将先到的时候，美国已经打赢两场战争的土地（伊拉克和阿富汗） ，并进行了广泛的打击恐怖主义的斗争。

The magnitude of the economic and political costs would be staggering, would be born by the United States done (there will be no “coalition of the willing,” in name or substance), and would come at a time when the US is already on a trajectory to spend between $2 and $3 trillion dollars on the war on Iraq (including long-term costs such as service on debt, veteran’s benefits, medical costs for brain and other long term injuries, replacements costs for material, etc.)巨大的经济和政治代价将是惊人的，将是出生在美国这样做（将不会有“意愿联盟” ，在名称或物质） ，并会在这个时候美国已经在的轨迹之间花费2美元和3万亿美元的美元对伊拉克发动战争（包括长期费用，如服务的债务，退伍军人福利，医疗费用的大脑和其他长期受伤，替换材料的费用等）

Any attack on Iran, regardless of how small, would require additional and longer US troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, if only as a cautionary move to protect the troops already deployed there.任何对伊朗发动攻击，不管多么小，将需要更多的和更长的美国部队部署在伊拉克和阿富汗，如果只作为警示动议，以保护部队已经部署在那里。 With parts of the US military already in danger of being stretched to the breaking point, the additional burdens of an attack on Iran could carry it over the edge.部分美军已经在危险之中延伸到断裂点，额外负担的袭击伊朗能够执行它的优势。 Finally, whatever progress has been achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year or so would most certainly be at risk.最后，无论已经取得了进展在伊拉克和阿富汗在过去一年左右的时间里将肯定是处于危险之中。 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the US could ever be successful in Iraq or Afghanistan following an attack on Iran, assuming Iran would respond with the express purpose of hitting US troops and undermining the American position.事实上，这是很难想象美国可能永远是成功的在伊拉克或阿富汗后，对伊朗发动攻击，伊朗将承担应付的明确目的击中美军士兵和破坏了美国的立场。

While most analysts focus on the political and economic costs of the use of force, it is also worth considering the issue of effectiveness.虽然大多数分析师侧重于政治和经济代价使用武力，这也是值得考虑的问题的有效性。 A military attack on Iran would likely set its nuclear program back, but for how long and towards what effect?军事袭击伊朗可能会设置其核计划回来，但多久，走向什么样的影响？ It appears that Iranian leadership has yet to make a command decision to build a nuclear weapon and public opinion data suggest that most Iranians do not want their country to acquire a nuclear weapon - though support for nuclear weapons acquisition has grown over time as the stand-off has deepened.看来，伊朗领导层还没有做出决定，命令制造核武器和公众舆论的数据表明，大多数伊朗人不希望自己的国家获得核武器-虽然支持核武器收购增长超过时间，待机关闭加深了。 Both elite and public attitudes would likely change following a US attack on Iran.这两种精英和公众的态度可能会改变后，美国对伊朗发动攻击。 Both the government and the public would endorse nuclear weapons acquisition.无论是政府和公众赞成核武器的收购。 Nuclear history suggests that the emergence of a pro-nuclear political consensus might well prove more important and more costly than any delay caused by the attack itself.核历史表明，出现了亲核政治共识，很可能证明更重要和更昂贵的任何延误所造成的攻击本身。 In short, an attack may actually hasten the very outcome it seeks to prevent: an Iran armed with nuclear weapons.总之，攻击实际上可能加速它的结果非常旨在防止：伊朗武装部队核武器。

Here is the full version of document. 这里是完整版本的文件。

Related articles: 相关文章：

1. The Iranian Nuclear Program: What the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] and its Criticizers Forgot 伊朗的核计划：哪些国家情报估计[聂]及其Criticizers忘记
2. Middle East Going Nuke 中东去核
3. Choices and Strategies for Dealing with Iran 选择和策略处理与伊朗关系