Homeland Security News Domovinske sigurnosti Novosti

Below are excerpts from testimony of Dr. Jim Walsh, Research Associate , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at the hearing of the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ovdje su izvadci od svjedočenja dr. Jim Walsh, znanstveni suradnik, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, na saslušanje u SAD Odbor za domovinske sigurnosti i vladinih poslova.

Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program Procjena Iran's nuklearnog programa

First, construction of centrifuges continues. Prvo, izgradnja Centrifuge nastavlja. The IAEA recently estimated that Iran has somewhat over 3,000 centrifuges, and the government has announced plans to build 6,000 more. U IAEA nedavno procjenjuje da Iran ima nešto više od 3000 Centrifuge, a Vlada je najavila da planira izgraditi još 6000.

Second, Iran has yet to demonstrate that it can run a system of centrifuge cascades at full capacity for an extended period of time. Drugo, Iran je još pokazati da je mogu pokrenuti sustav centrifuga kaskade na puni kapacitet za produžen razdoblje. More specifically, it is unclear if Iran can operate fragile centrifuges fed with Iranian-produced nuclear fuel without a major or even catastrophic breakdown. Konkretnije, to je nejasno, ako Iran može raditi krhke Centrifuge pune sa-iranski proizvedene nuklearnog goriva, bez većih ili čak katastrofalan slom.

Third, there is an ongoing mix of achievement, technical problems, and bravado. Treće, tu je u tijeku mix postignuća, tehničke probleme, i razmetanje hrabrošću. It is Iran’s interest to claim success in the field of enrichment, to create facts on the ground, to make enrichment a fait accompli. Iran je u interesu da tvrde uspjeha u području obogaćivanje, stvoriti činjenice na terenu, kako bi obogaćivanje jedan svršen čin. Grand announcements have not always been followed by grand accomplishments. Grand najavama nisu uvijek slijedi velika postignuća. Rumors of technical problems persist for a program that has had many ups and downs over the course of twenty years. Glasine tehničkih problema oduprijeti se za program koji je imao mnogo prozora i padovi tijekom dvadeset godina. Nevertheless, Iran has made progress. Ipak, Iran je napravio napredak. It has produced low enriched uranium on a very small scale. Ima proizvedene niskim obogaćenog uranijuma na vrlo malim razmjerima. It has constructed thousands of centrifuges, and most recently it has inboduced a new centrifuge design, the IR-2, which is intended to get around some of the difficulties it had encountered with the Pakistani centrifuge design it procured from AQ Kahn. On je izgradio tisuća Centrifuge, a većina nedavno je inboduced novi dizajn centrifuga, IC-2, koji je namijenjen da se oko nekih od problema je naišao s Pakistanac centrifuga dizajn je nabavljena iz AQ Kahn.

As we look to the future, one should probably expect more of the same: big announcements, greater progress in construction than in operation, technical achievement combined with ongoing technical hurdles. Kao što smo gledati u budućnost, vjerojatno treba očekivati više od istog: velikim najavama, veći napredak u izgradnji nego u rad, tehničko dostignuće u kombinaciji s tekućim tehničkim vještačka prepreka. As it stands, Iran does not have an enrichment program that can be a reliable supplier of highly enriched uranium for a weapons program, but assuming present conditions, they should come increasingly close to that threshold over a period of years. Kao što stoji, Iran nema obogaćivanje programa koji mogu biti pouzdani dobavljač visoko obogaćenog urana za oružje programa, ali uz pretpostavku predstaviti uvjete, oni bi trebali doći sve u blizini koji prag tijekom razdoblja od godine.

What are Alternatives for the Near and Long-term? Koje su alternative za blizini i dugoročnih?

Sanctions Sankcija

Sanctions Have Not and Will Not Induce Iran to End Its Centrifuge Program. Sankcije nisu i neće navoditi Iran do kraja centrifuga njen program.

Containment Containment

The same is true for a policy of containment, balancing and reassurance. Isto vrijedi za politiku containment, balansiranje i osiguranje. A containment policy seeks to isolate Iran, while balancing and reassurance includes steps to counter the Islamic Republic by strengthening the capabilities of US allies in the Gulf and in the region more generally. A containment politike nastoji izolirati Iran, dok balansiranje i ponovno uključuje korake kako bi se brojilo Islamske Republike jačanje sposobnosti za saveznika SAD-u i zaljeva u regiji općenito. It might also involve making clear America’s commitment to protect our friends should Iran seek to cause trouble. To također može uključivati izradu Amerika je jasno opredjeljenje kako bi zaštitili naše prijatelje treba da Iran nastoji zadati muke. In practical terms, containment means continuing to do what the US has been doing since 1979. U praktičnim uvjetima, containment znači nastaviti raditi ono što je SAD radi od 1979. Balancing and reassurance could involve increasing arms sales, stationing US troops, positioning US military assets, and verbal or written assurances from the US government describing how the US would react to potential Iranian provocations. Balansiranje i ponovno mogao uključivati povećanje prodaje oružja, stationing US vojnika, pozicioniranje US vojne imovine, a usmeni ili pismeni osiguranja od US vlade SAD opisuje kako bi reagirati na potencijalnu iranski provokacija.

Use of military force Upotreba vojne sile

Unlike the policy alternatives discussed above, the use of military force would address the problem of Iran’s enrichment program. Za razliku od politike alternative gore objašnjeno, korištenje vojnih snaga bi adresu problem Iran's obogaćivanje programa. The problem, of course, is that it would do so with limited effectiveness and at an unacceptable cost. Problem je, naravno, je da će učiniti s ograničenom učinkovitost i na neprihvatljiv trošak. A full discussion of the military option is not possible here, but it has been the subject of extensive and detailed discussion, and at least a couple of points are worth noting. Cjelovita rasprava o vojnim opcija nije moguće ovdje, ali to je predmet opsežne i detaljne diskusije, i barem nekoliko bodova su napomenuti.

To begin with, the military option is redly a set of options across a continuum that runs from “limited” air strikes against known nuclear facilities up to and including attacks on leadership and strategic targets and the use of ground troops, followed by the removal of the Iran’s revolutionary government. Da biste započeli s vojnom mogućnost je crveno niz mogućnosti preko kontinuum koji prometuje iz "ograničena" zračnih udara protiv poznatih nuklearnih postrojenja, uključujući i do napada na vodstvo i strateške ciljeve i korištenje zemlje vojnika, a nakon uklanjanja Iran je u revolucionarni vlade. Moving from option to option along this continuum involves a tradeoff. Idući od opcija za opciju uz ovaj kontinuum uključuje tradeoff. More modest uses of force leave the Iranian regime with a full array of retaliatory capabilities that they could use in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Više skromna koristi silom napustiti iranski režim s punim niz odmazdan sposobnosti da bi mogli koristiti u Iraku, Afganistanu i drugdje. On the other hand, a larger scale use of force intended in part to attrit the Islamic Republic’s ability to retaliate, necessarily involves larger costs of other kinds: economic costs, a short-term but substantial spike in the price of oil, American casualties, an uproar in the Muslim world that would likely contribute to an increase in extremism and renewed opportunities for al Qaeda and its off-shoots - to name a few. S druge strane, veći razmjera uporabe sile u dio namijenjen za attrit Islamske Republike sposobnost da se osvetiti, nužno uključuje veće troškove od drugih vrsta: ekonomski troškovi, kratkoročni, ali bitan smeč u cijenu nafte, američki zrtava, Buka u muslimanskom svijetu da bi se vjerojatno doprinijeti povećanje u ekstremizam i obnovio mogućnosti za al-Qaeda i svoje off-izbojci - u ime nekoliko. These costs would come-at a time when the US is already fighting two land wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and is engaged in a broad-based struggle against terrorism. Ovi troškovi će doći-u trenutku kada je SAD već dvije zemlje u borbi protiv rata (Irak i Afganistan) i angažiran je u široko usmjeren borbi protiv terorizma.

The magnitude of the economic and political costs would be staggering, would be born by the United States done (there will be no “coalition of the willing,” in name or substance), and would come at a time when the US is already on a trajectory to spend between $2 and $3 trillion dollars on the war on Iraq (including long-term costs such as service on debt, veteran’s benefits, medical costs for brain and other long term injuries, replacements costs for material, etc.) Veličina gospodarske i političke troškove bi biti zapanjujući, biti rođen od strane United States učinio (neće biti "spremni za koaliciju", u ime ili tvar), te bi se u trenutku kada SAD je već na jedan put potrošiti između $ 2 i $ 3 trilijuna dolara na rat u Iraku (uključujući dugoročne troškove kao što su usluge na dug, veteran je koristi, medicinske troškove za mozga i drugih dugoročnih ozljeda, zamjena za materijalne troškove, itd.)

Any attack on Iran, regardless of how small, would require additional and longer US troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, if only as a cautionary move to protect the troops already deployed there. Bilo koji napad na Iran, bez obzira koliko je mali, bi zahtijevati dodatna i duže odjuriti US deployments na Irak i Afganistan, ako samo kao opominjući potez za zaštitu vojnika raspoređeno već postoji. With parts of the US military already in danger of being stretched to the breaking point, the additional burdens of an attack on Iran could carry it over the edge. Sa dijelovima SAD vojno već u opasnosti da se pruži na razbijanje trenutku, dodatni teret za napad na Iran mogao nositi ga preko ruba. Finally, whatever progress has been achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year or so would most certainly be at risk. Konačno, sve što napredak je postignut u Iraku i Afganistanu u posljednjih godinu dana ili tako da bi većina sigurno biti u opasnosti. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the US could ever be successful in Iraq or Afghanistan following an attack on Iran, assuming Iran would respond with the express purpose of hitting US troops and undermining the American position. Doista, teško je zamisliti kako je SAD mogao ikada biti uspješna u Irak ili Afganistan nakon napada na Iran, uz pretpostavku da Iran odgovoriti s ciljem izraziti skom US vojnika i podrivanju američke pozicije.

While most analysts focus on the political and economic costs of the use of force, it is also worth considering the issue of effectiveness. Dok većina analitičara se fokusirati na političke i ekonomske troškove uporabe sile, također je vrijedno s obzirom na pitanje učinkovitost. A military attack on Iran would likely set its nuclear program back, but for how long and towards what effect? Vojni napad na Iran bi vjerojatno postaviti svog nuklearnog programa nazad, ali za koliko dugo i prema što efekt? It appears that Iranian leadership has yet to make a command decision to build a nuclear weapon and public opinion data suggest that most Iranians do not want their country to acquire a nuclear weapon - though support for nuclear weapons acquisition has grown over time as the stand-off has deepened. Čini se da je Iranac vodstvo tek treba napraviti zapovjedna odluka o izgradnji nuklearnog oružja i javnog mnijenja podaci ukazuju na to da većina Iranians ne želite da se njihove zemlje kako bi stekli nuklearno oružje - iako je podrška za nuklearno oružje stjecanja je narasla tijekom vremena kao stand - isključen je produbiti. Both elite and public attitudes would likely change following a US attack on Iran. Oba elita i javnost stavovi bi se vjerojatno promijeniti nakon napada SAD na Iran. Both the government and the public would endorse nuclear weapons acquisition. Obje vlade i javnosti bi podrzavaju nuklearnog oružja akvizicija. Nuclear history suggests that the emergence of a pro-nuclear political consensus might well prove more important and more costly than any delay caused by the attack itself. Nuklearna povijesti sugerira da nastajanja pro-nuklearne politički konsenzus može dobro dokazati važniji i više skuplje nego bilo kašnjenje uzrokovan napad sama. In short, an attack may actually hasten the very outcome it seeks to prevent: an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Ukratko, napad svibanj požuriti zapravo je vrlo ishod traži da spriječi: jedan Iran oružanim s nuklearnim oružjem.

Here is the full version of document. Ovdje je puna verzija dokumenta.

Related articles: Vezane teme:

1. The Iranian Nuclear Program: What the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] and its Criticizers Forgot U iranskih nuklearnih programa: Što je Nacionalni obavještajnim Procijenite [Nie] i njegove Zaboravili Criticizers
2. Middle East Going Nuke Bliski Istok ide Nuke
3. Choices and Strategies for Dealing with Iran Izbor i strategija za rješavanje Irana