The units will be key elements of the new Defense Department chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive consequence management enterprise. The enterprise also will include a defense CBRNE Response Force, two consequence-management command and control elements, 57 weapons of mass destruction civil support teams and 17 CBRNE-enhanced response force packages.

One unit will be based in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. The units are scheduled to have 270 Guardsmen, and each will have a medical team, a search and extraction team, a decontamination team and very robust command and control capabilities, officials said. The units are arranged in such a way that they will be able to drive to the site of an event within 12 hours.

The forces are part of a larger reorganization of the Defense Department’s domestic consequence management enterprise recommended in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

These funds include $45.4 million for a new inline baggage screening system in the main terminal at Charlotte Douglas International Airport, and $3.1 million for the design of an upgraded inline baggage screening system in Terminals One and Two at St. Louis International Airport.

The inline screening systems use state-of-the art technology to screen checked baggage for explosives more quickly, while streamlining the ticketing process. They also provide on-screen resolution capabilities for security officers screening baggage—reducing the number of re-scans and physical bag searches.

Additionally, Orlando International Airport will receive $7.5 million to expand their closed circuit television (CCTV) system with several hundred cameras to provide enhanced surveillance capabilities throughout the airport.

ARRA, signed into law by President Obama on Feb. 17, 2009, committed more than $3 billion for homeland security projects through DHS and the General Services Administration. Of the $1 billion allocated to TSA for aviation security projects, $734 million is dedicated to screening checked baggage and $266 million is allocated for checkpoint explosives detection technologies.

Hear how we will ensure a joined up multi-agency approach and the challenge of striking a balance between effective and visible security.

Keynote addresses also include:

• Assistant Chief Constable John Wright, Head of Prevent, Office of the National Co-ordinator Special Branch, Home Office, UK
• Asim Hafeez, Head of Intervention, Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, Home Office, UK
• Detective Chief Inspector Raffaele D’Orsi, S015 Counter Terrorism Command Ports, Metropolitan Police, UK

HOW TO BOOK
Visit http://www.smi-online.co.uk/counter-terrorism7.asp
Contact Teri Arri on: +44 (0) 20 7827 6162or email: tarri@smi-online.co.uk

Terrorism threatens people everywhere and undermines peace, stability and security. All acts of terrorism are criminal, inhumane, and unjustifiable irrespective of motivation. We condemn suicide bombings, and we abhor in particular the practice of recruiting the young or disadvantaged to carry out such acts. We deplore the upsurge in hostage-takings perpetrated by terrorists, as such abductions are repugnant to our fundamental notions of freedom, and we commit to work together to prevent their proliferation and bring those responsible to justice. We express our concern about the links of some terrorists to illicit drug trafficking and organized crime – we are determined to disrupt these partnerships of convenience. As highlighted at the Washington Summit on Nuclear security, nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security.

Terrorism will not be defeated by force alone. It is critical to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and, in particular, that governments promote the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic values, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness to offer a viable alternative to those who could be susceptible to terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to violence. We are committed to helping countries address their basic development needs and meet the legitimate aspirations of their people. All peoples everywhere deserve security in their communities, education for their children, opportunity for employment and a sense of dignity and self-worth.

We reaffirm that full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law is critical to an effective counter-terrorism strategy, and we reject the false choice between our security and our democratic values. All of our actions against terrorism must be consistent with the UN Charter and applicable international law. We reiterate the central role of the UN in the fight against terrorism and stress the importance of full implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We strongly urge all states to join and implement the international conventions and protocols against terrorism. We welcome improvements to the UN al-Qa’ida and Taliban sanctions regime, most recently the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1904, and we underscore the importance of further progress in its implementation, and continuing work in support of fair and clear procedures.

Terrorism is a global threat that requires a global response. No single country or group of countries can hope to defeat terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, extensive international cooperation has weakened the ability of terrorists to recruit, train, fund and execute attacks. We are committed to further enhancing international cooperation, by strengthening old partnerships and building new ones with governments, multilateral organizations and the private sector. We also recognize the crucial role of civil society in effective counter-terrorism efforts. We pledge to strengthen the cooperation between relevant UN bodies and the G-8 and, together with committed partners, we will work to broaden, deepen and make more robust the global multilateral counter-terrorism umbrella.

We recognize the role of the G-8 Roma/Lyon Group (comprised of our counter-terrorism and anti-crime experts) in the global fight against terrorism, as well as the work of the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), which seeks to build capacity and political will to assist countries in addressing the terrorist threat. We applaud Canada’s leadership in bringing strategic focus to the groups’ efforts through the preparation of a robust action plan on counter-terrorism and organized crime. We endorse this plan.

We underscore our determination to work cooperatively on key challenges, including transportation security, border security and identity integrity, preventing chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological terrorism, combating terrorism financing, countering violent extremism, radicalization leading to violence, and recruitment. Given the complex nature of the terrorist threat, an integrated and coordinated G-8 response is essential to meeting this challenge.

We acknowledge that terrorist groups and other criminal organizations tend to flourish where governments lack the capacity and resiliency to address security vulnerabilities, in some cases threatening the stability of states. We emphasize the essential role capacity-building can play to support countries in need of assistance to fulfill their international counter-terrorism commitments. Addressing the institutional weaknesses that allow terrorists to operate freely is a critical element of our efforts. Building upon the efforts of the CTAG, we emphasize the need to improve the coordination of the growing bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives, and to make these efforts more innovative, far-reaching and sustained. We recognize the profound effects of terrorism on these countries and regions, and we are mindful of their needs. We, the G-8 countries, stand together to support them, in particular, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sahel, Somalia and Yemen. We will seek to build closer cooperation among relevant G-8 partner programs to make our effort to address terrorism and related security threats more coherent and effective.

Despite our operational successes against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups, radicalization leading to violence remains a source of serious concern. Special attention must be paid to curtailing the influence of violent extremists, undermining their false narrative, isolating them from the people they pretend to serve and disrupting their misuse of the internet. Our work will focus on identifying the drivers of violent extremism and then on preventing those most at risk of recruitment and radicalization from becoming terrorists.

By preying on the innocent and vulnerable, terrorists cause unspeakable harm to the very fabric of society. Their actions impact not only the victims, but their families, friends and fellow citizens. Survivors of terrorism and their families have risen against terrorism in the aftermath of horrific attacks. We reiterate our commitment to further develop initiatives that assist them. They are giving a voice to victims while bravely speaking out against violent and extremist ideologies. We stand with them and their families, and we are committed to ensuring that their voices are heard and that the victims are never forgotten.

Senator Byron L. Dorgan said:

Unmanned vehicles are going to be the future not only of the Air Force, but also an increasing amount of aviation activity in the decades ahead.

The report provides detailed year-by-year (2010-2015) forecasts for the following U.S. U.S. Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) market segments:

- R&D, tests and evaluation
- Unmanned Air Vehicles
- Payloads
- Ground Control Systems
- Service, support and maintenance
- Training
- Data management
- Revenues by UAV Groups (by vehicle airspeed, weight, and operating altitude)

Market Research media analysts have found that there is a widening gap between growing UAV fleet and UAV infrastructure development, especially in such sectors as training; service, support and maintenance; and data management. This gap creates a number of market opportunities for UAV vendors, both large defense contractors and small technology companies.

The UAV market has witnessed a meteoric growth over the past decade. UAS development went through a quantum leap, from lab concept to battle-tested proven technology. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proven their worth in operations around the world. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are considered today a key component of U.S. defense transformation and an integral part of U.S. military doctrine.

Mavi Marmara Photo, Courtesy of IsraelPictures.org

Senator Cornyn said:

“Every country has a right to defend itself, and Israel is no different. The flotilla was a disgraceful and premeditated attempt to provoke a violent confrontation with Israel, hidden under the cloak of a humanitarian relief effort. This type of despicable conduct must be condemned and I hope my colleagues will join me in cosponsoring this important resolution to help remind the world that the United States stands with Israel.”

On May 28th, 2010, the “Free Gaza” flotilla, sponsored by a Turkish organization and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, which included the Mavi Marmara and five other ships, departed from a Turkish port and sailed towards Israel’s defensive naval blockade of Gaza. On May 31st, 2010, after repeated Israeli calls to turn around or be peacefully escorted to a port outside of Gaza, the Israeli Navy intercepted the Mavi Marmara 75 miles west of Haifa, Israel, to maintain the integrity of blockade and prevent the potential smuggling of arms and other materials to Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Upon boarding, the Mavi Marmara passengers brutally and violently attacked members of the Israeli Navy with knives, clubs, pipes, and other weapons. Israelis used lethal force in self-defense and killed nine attackers.

Senator Cornyn’s resolution places these events in their historical and strategic context. Since 2001, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations have fired more than 10,000 rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel, which killed at least 18 Israelis and wounded dozens more. Currently, approximately 860,000 Israeli civilians—more than 12 percent of Israel’s total population resides within range of the rockets fired from Gaza. In 2007, Israel put in place a legitimate and justified blockade of Gaza out of concern for the safety of its citizens, which has been effective in reducing the firing of rockets from Gaza into southern Israel.

Senator Cornyn’s resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that Israel has an undeniable right to defend itself against any threat to its security. Senator Cornyn’s resolution also makes clear that recent criticism of Israel at the United Nations undermines Israel’s inherent right to self-defense, compromises its sovereignty, and helps legitimize Hamas.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today a set of designations targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs – the first set of measures from the United States implementing UNSCR 1929 and building upon the actions mandated by the Security Council. Today’s actions also highlight for the international community Iran’s use of its financial sector, shipping industry and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to carry out and mask its proliferation activities, and respond to the Council’s call for all states to take action to prevent their own financial systems from being abused by Iran.

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 – which is aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems – Treasury today designated:

* Post Bank of Iran for providing financial services to, and acting on behalf of, Bank Sepah
* Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) entities and individuals
o The IRGC Air Force and IRGC Missile Command, both of which have ties to Iran’s ballistic missile program
o Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co. for their ties to previously designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
o Two individuals for their roles in the IRGC
* Two individuals and two entities for their ties to Iran’s WMD programs, including Javedan Mehr Toos, a procurement broker for Kalaye Electric Company
* Five Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) front companies

Treasury also today identified 27 vessels as property blocked because of their connection to IRISL and updated the entries for 71 already-blocked IRISL vessels to identify new names given to these vessels as part of IRISL’s efforts to evade sanctions. To view the complete list of the vessel name changes, visit link.

As a result of today’s designations, all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person are prohibited, and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Treasury also today identified 22 entities in the insurance, petroleum and petrochemicals industries determined to be owned or controlled by the Government of Iran by adding them to Appendix A to the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR). The ITR prohibit transactions between U.S. persons and the Government of Iran. These identifications allow U.S. persons and others to identify Iranian Government entities and protect themselves against the risks posed by such entities. To view the complete list, visit link.

Post Bank of Iran

Treasury is today designating Post Bank of Iran for providing financial services to, and acting on behalf of, Bank Sepah. Bank Sepah was designated in January 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing financial services to Iran’s missile industry, including two entities linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program, Shahid Bakeri Industries Group and Shahid Hemmat Industries Group. Bank Sepah was subsequently designated by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747.

Since 2007, Bank Sepah has faced severe difficulties in processing international transactions. Prior to the designation of Bank Sepah, Post Bank’s business was nearly entirely conducted within Iran. With Iran’s state-owned banks, facing increasing sanctions, Iran began using Post Bank to facilitate international trade. In fact, Post Bank stepped into the shoes of Bank Sepah, after it was designated by the UN, to carry out Bank Sepah’s transactions and hide its identity. In 2009, Post Bank facilitated business on behalf of Bank Sepah between Iran’s defense industries and overseas beneficiaries.

Post Bank, on behalf of Bank Sepah, has also facilitated millions of dollars worth of business between Hong Kong Electronics and other overseas beneficiaries. Hong Kong Electronics was designated by Treasury in June 2009 under E.O. 13382 for providing support to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and its primary weapons dealer, Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon, named in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and designated under UNSCR 1718, is a commercial bank based in Pyongyang North Korea, and is the financial arm of KOMID, which is also named in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Treasury today is targeting the IRGC Air Force and IRGC Missile Command, key elements in the operational deployment of Iran’s ballistic missile capability, and Rah Sahel as well as Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co., two subsidiaries of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), the engineering arm of the IRGC that serves to help the IRGC generate income and fund its operations. KAA owned or controlled by the IRGC and is involved in the construction of streets, highways, tunnels, water conveyance projects, agricultural restoration, and pipelines. KAA was designated by Treasury under E.O. 13382 in October 2007 and most recently under UNSCR 1929. Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co. were also sanctioned on June 9, 2010 by the United Nations with the adoption of UNSCR 1929.

The IRGC maintains significant political and economic power in Iran. It has ties to companies controlling billions of dollars in business and construction projects and it is a growing presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors. The IRGC has numerous economic interests related to defense production, construction, and the oil industry.

The IRGC was designated by the State Departmentunder E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation-related activities. The IRGC has been outspoken in its willingness to facilitate the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD. The IRGC has broad links to Iran’s ballistic missile programs and is one of the primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing the Shahab-3 missile.

Treasury is also designating today the following individuals for their roles in the IRGC:

* Mohammad Ali Jafari has been the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC since September 2007.
* Mohammad Reza Naqdi has served as head of the IRGC’s Basij Resistance Force since October 2009. Naqdi was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2008 under UNSCR 1803 for being the former Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of the State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters. The U.N. described him as being involved in efforts to evade the sanctions previously imposed under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747.

Entities and Individuals with Ties to Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Javedan Mehr Toos, an entity that serves as a procurement broker for Kalaye Electric Company, is being designated today for providing services to, and acting on behalf of, Kalaye Electric Company.

Kalaye Electric Company was designated by Treasury in February 2007, also pursuant to E.O. 13382, for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the main organization in Iran for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology, including Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program and experimental laser enrichment of uranium program. AEOI, which reports directly to Iran’s president and manages Iran’s overall nuclear program, was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and sanctioned by the United Nations under UNSCR 1737. Kalaye Electric Company is linked to Iran’s centrifuge research and development efforts. Both organizations are listed in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 because of their involvement in Iran’s nuclear program.

Since 2009, Javedan Mehr Toos, located in Tehran, has been sought out by Kalaye Electric Company to obtain a variety of nuclear-related equipment on the international market, including magnets which can be used in centrifuges. In early 2010, Javedan Mehr Toos procured specialized valves and vacuum gauges that could ultimately be used for Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

Treasury also designated today the following individuals and entity for their ties to Iran’s nuclear and WMD programs:

* Javad Karimi Sabet has been linked to AEOI since at least 2006, serving as the head of Novin Energy Company (Novin). Novin was designated by Treasury in January 2006 under E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by the AEOI, and was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747.
* Ahmad Vahidi serves as Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), a position he has held since September 2009. Prior to that, he served as Iran’s Deputy Defense Minister and held positions with the IRGC-Qods Force. MODAFL has ultimate authority over Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), both of which have been designated under E.O. 13382.
* The Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (aka Cruise Missile Industry Group or CMIG) is owned or controlled by the AIO. The AIO is the overall manager and coordinator of Iran’s missile program and oversees all of Iran’s missile industries. CMIG was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747 for being involved in the development and production of cruise missiles, as well as being responsible for naval missiles.

Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

Treasury took further action today against the network of Iran’s national maritime carrier, IRISL, by designating five front companies aiding IRISL in evading sanctions, identified 27 new vessels as blocked property due to their connection to IRISL, and updating the entries for 71 already-blocked IRISL vessels to identify new names given to them in order to evade sanctions.

Treasury designated IRISL in September 2008 pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for providing logistical services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL has authority over the AIO, the arm of the Iranian military that oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program, and has used IRISL to conceal the true destination of shipments of military-related goods destined for MODAFL.

Since being designated, IRISL has increasingly relied upon a series of front companies and has engaged in deceptive behavior – such as falsifying shipping documents and renaming ships – to assist it in overcoming the impact of sanctions and increased scrutiny of its behavior. IRISL has also been involved in Iranian attempts to transfer arms-related material. Iran is prohibited from exporting arms and related material by UNSCR 1747.

IRISL established the front company, Hafiz Darya Shipping Company (HDS Lines), in 2009, to conduct its containerized shipping operations under the HDS Lines brand name. HDS has retained some IRISL officers as corporate members. In late 2009, HDS Lines assumed IRISL’s containerized shipping operations and established shipping routes nearly identical to those formerly operated by IRISL.

Similarly, IRISL created Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Company, also designated today, which has assumed IRISL’s ship management functions in the wake of sanctions against IRISL. Like HDS Lines, it also shares corporate officers with IRISL.

Safiran Payam Darya (SAPID) Shipping Co., also designated today, was created by IRISL in April 2009 to take control of several ships previously directly owned by IRISL and to handle IRISL’s former bulk and general cargo operations. SAPID’s directors and/or shareholders are five members of IRISL’s Board of Directors: Mohammad Hossein Dajmar, IRISL’s Managing Director; Gholamhossein Golpavar, IRISL’s Commercial Director; Mohammad Mehdi Rasekh; Masoud Nik Nafs; and Mohammad Sadegh Mofateh. Dajmar serves as SAPID’s Chairman, and Nik Nafs serves as its Vice-Chairman. Golparvar serves as SAPID’s Managing Director, while Rasekh and Mofateh serve as SAPID directors.

Two Hong Kong-based companies affiliated with IRISL, Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics are also being designated today.

Today’s designations of IRISL front companies and identification of new and renamed IRISL-affiliated vessels also reinforce UNSCR 1803, which among other things, calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, cargoes to and from Iran, aircraft and vessels, at their seaports and airports, including their ports, owned or operated by IRISL, “provided there is reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel is transporting goods prohibited” under UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.

Identifying Information

HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO. A.K.A. HDS LINES; HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES COMPANY

Location: No 60. Ehteshamiyeh Square

7th Neyestan Street

Pasdaran Avenue

Tehran, Iran

IMO Number: 5878431

SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY

Location: No. 5 Shabnam Alley

Golzar Street

Fajr Street

Shahid Motahari Avenue Tehran

193651, Iran

Location: P.O. Box 19365-1114 Tehran, Iran

IMO Number: 5466371

SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY

AKA SAPID SHIPPING CO

Official Address: No. 3, 8th Narenjestan Street, Artesh Boulevard,

Farmaniyah Avenue, Tehran, Iran

Alt. Address: No. 33, 8th Narenjestan Street

Artesh Boulevard, Aghdasieh,

Tehran, Iran

Office Address: P.O. Box 1963116 Tehran, Iran

Web Page: www.sapidshpg.com

E-mail: info@sapidshpg.com

SEIBOW LIMITED

Location: Room 803

8/F

Futura Plaza

111 How Kimg St

Kwun Tong, Kowloon

Hong Kong

Incorporation No.: 926320

SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED

Location: Room 803

8/F

Futura Plaza

111 How Kimg St

Kwun Tong, Kowloon

Hong Kong

Incorporation No.: 1218675

Iranian Transactions Regulations

INSURANCE

1. BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A. BIUK): Bimeh Iran Insurance Company (U.K.) Limited is a London-based entity that is owned or controlled (99%) by Iran Insurance Company.
2. IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (A.K.A. BIMEH IRAN): Iran Insurance Company is a parastatal that is wholly-owned by the Government of Iran.

PETROLEUM, PETROCHEMICALS & ASSOCIATED ENTITIES

1. MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN (A.K.A. KALA NAFT CO SSK; A.K.A. KALA NAFT COMPANY LTD; A.K.A. KALA NAFT TEHRAN; A.K.A. KALA NAFT TEHRAN COMPANY; A.K.A. KALAYEH NAFT CO; A.K.A. M.S.P.-KALA; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING SUPPORT & PROCUREMENT CO.-KALA NAFT; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING SUPPORT AND PROCUREMENT (M.S.P.) KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING, SUPPORT AND PROCUREMENT KALA NAFT COMPANY; A.K.A. MSP KALA NAFT TEHRAN COMPANY; A.K.A. MSP KALANAFT; A.K.A. MSP-KALANAFT COMPANY; A.K.A. SHERKAT SAHAMI KHASS KALA NAFT; A.K.A. SHERKAT SAHAMI KHASS POSHTIBANI VA TEHIYEH KALAYE NAFT TEHRAN; A.K.A. SHERKATE POSHTIBANI SAKHT VA TAHEIH KALAIE NAFTE): MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran is a Tehran-based entity that is responsible, along with other entities, for procurement on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company (”NIOC”), which is an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran is wholly-owned by NIOC. In 2007, MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran was listed by the Japanese government as an entity of concern for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapon proliferation. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
2. KALA LIMITED (A.K.A. KALA NAFT LONDON LTD): Kala Limited is the London-based procurement arm for MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran, an entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
3. KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED: Kala Pension Trust Limited, is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by Kala Limited; it is an investment arm for Kala Naft, the procurement arm of NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
4. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD: National Iranian Oil Company PTE Ltd is a Singapore-based entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
5. IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A IOC UK LTD): London-based Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Limited is an entity that is wholly-owned by Naftiran Intertrade Co Ltd. (NICO). Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Limited is fully-funded and supported by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
6. NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED: NIOC International Affairs (London) Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
7. NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED: Naftiran Trading Services Co. (NTS) Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
8. NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED: NICO Engineering Limited is a Jersey-registered entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
9. NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (A.K.A. NPC): The National Petrochemical Company (NPC) is a subsidiary of the Iranian Petroleum Ministry and is wholly-owned by the Government of Iran. It is responsible for the development and operation of Iran’s petrochemical sector and is the second-largest producer and exporter of petrochemicals in the Middle East.
10. IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (A.K.A. Petrochemical Commercial Company; A.K.A. Sherkate Basargani Petrochemie (Sahami Khass); A.K.A. Sherkate Bazargani Petrchemie; A.K.A. IPCC; A.K.A. PCC): Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NPC.
11. NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (A.K.A. N P C International Ltd; A.K.A. NPC International Company;): NPC International Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned and controlled by NPC.
12. INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH (A.K.A. Intra-chem Trading Co. (GMBH)): Intra Chem Trading GmbH is a Hamburg-based that is wholly-owned by Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.
13. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (A.K.A. Petrochemical Commercial Company International Ltd; A.K.A. Petrochemical Trading Company Limited; A.K.A. PCCI): The Petrochemical Commercial Company International Limited is a Jersey-based entity that is wholly-owned by NPC.
14. P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED (A.K.A. P.C.C. Singapore Branch A.K.A. PCC Singapore Pte Ltd): P.C.C. (Singapore) Private Limited is a Singapore-based entity that is wholly-owned by Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company
15. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE (A.K.A. PCC FZE): The Petrochemical Commercial Company FZE is a Dubai-based entity that is wholly-owned by the Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.
16. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A. PCC (UK); A.K.A. PCC UK; A.K.A. PCC UK LTD): The Petrochemical Commercial Company (U.K.) Limited is a London-based and wholly-owned subsidiary of the Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.
17. PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED (A.K.A. Petro Iran Development Company; A.K.A. PEDCO): Petroiran Development Company (Pedco) Limited is a Jersey-registered entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
18. PETROPARS LTD. (A.K.A. Petropars Limited; A.K.A. PPL): Petropars Ltd. is an entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
19. PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE (A.K.A. PPI FZE): Petropars International FZE is a Dubai-based entity that is wholly-owned by Petropars Ltd.
20. PETROPARS UK LIMITED: Petropars UK Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by Petropars Ltd.

###

Secretary Geithner’s remarks:

Over the past year and a half, President Obama has pursued a broad, international strategy to address deep concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.

A critical step in that strategy came last week, when the UN Security Council adopted the toughest sanctions ever imposed on the Iranian government.

Today, the United States is taking our first steps to implement and build on that resolution.

We are adding to our list of sanctioned entities a number of institutions and individuals who are helping Iran to fund nuclear and missile programs and to evade international sanctions.

Our actions today are designed to deter other governments and foreign financial institutions from dealing with these entities and thereby supporting Iran’s illicit activities.

Let me briefly describe each of these actions.

First, we are designating Iran’s Post Bank for its support of proliferation activities. This brings the number of Iranian-owned banks on our list to 16.

Second, we are adding five front companies and more than ninety ship names that Iran’s national maritime carrier has been using to try and evade sanctions.

Third, we are adding two individuals and four entities that are part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which plays a key role in Iran’s missile programs and support for terrorism.

Fourth, we are adding two individuals and two entities that are actively involved in Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

And finally, we are identifying 22 petroleum, energy and insurance companies – located inside and outside Iran – that are owned or controlled by the Iranian government.

Shortly, Stuart Levey, Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, will provide you with more details on these actions.

Stuart has been the chief architect of our strategy to impose growing financial costs on Iran for its continued defiance and he has played a major leadership role on this issue internationally.

In the coming weeks, we will continue to increase the financial pressure on Iran.

We will continue to target Iran’s support for terrorist organizations.

We will continue to focus on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

And we will continue to expose Iran’s efforts to evade international sanctions.

Now, to be truly effective in ending Iran’s proliferation activities and Iran’s support for terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international approach.

This is not something the United States can do alone.

We need other countries to move with us.

So alongside our efforts to build international support for new sanctions, we have been working behind the scenes, building international support among finance ministers, for additional actions to prevent abuse of the global financial system by Iran.

We expect to see additional actions announced by other governments soon.

The types of steps we are taking today have been remarkably effective.

When major international institutions find out they’re actually working with a company that supports Iran’s nuclear or missile programs, they realize it’s not worth the risk.

They cut off their business.

And over the years, this has made a major difference in limiting Iran’s ability to use the global financial system to pursue illicit activities.

We have made important progress. But we cannot stop. Iran will never cease looking for new ways to evade our sanctions. So our efforts must be ongoing and unrelenting.

We will keep working to intensify financial pressure on Iran.

Thank you.

Let me now turn it over to Stuart.

Secretary Levey’s remarks:

As Secretary Geithner said, we are taking a series of steps today to impose additional consequences on Iran for its continuing failure to meet its international obligations.

First, we are sanctioning an additional Iranian bank, Post Bank. At one time, Post Bank’s business was conducted almost entirely within Iran. But when some of Iran’s largest banks were exposed for financing proliferation, Iran began to use Post Bank to facilitate international trade. In fact, Post Bank stepped into the shoes of Bank Sepah, which is under UN sanctions, to carry out Bank Sepah’s transactions and hide its identity. International banks that would never deal with Bank Sepah have been handling these transactions that they think are really for Post Bank.

Second, we are taking action against Iran’s national maritime carrier, IRISL. Since we sanctioned IRISL in 2008, it has desperately attempted to evade those sanctions, setting up new front companies, renaming and even repainting vessels to hide their true ownership. Despite its deceptive maneuvers, IRISL has had to struggle to obtain insurance and other services.

Third, we are taking further action against the IRGC, or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The IRGC plays a key role in Iran’s missile program and support for terrorism and it has taken over broad portions of the Iranian economy, to the detriment of the Iranian people. With today’s designations, we have now sanctioned 26 entities and individuals connected to the IRGC, and we will continue to do so. No IRGC entity should have any place in the world’s legitimate financial system.

Fourth, we are sanctioning two individuals and two entities for proliferation, including a key broker used by Iran to procure a variety of nuclear-related equipment.

Finally, we are identifying 22 petroleum, energy, and insurance companies owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, including 17 located outside Iran and many that are not easily identifiable as Iranian. Americans have long been forbidden to do business with Iranian entities. Companies around the world are increasingly deciding not to do business with the government of Iran because of its illicit conduct and because, as President Obama said last week, it is a government “that brutally suppressed dissent and murdered the innocent.” The UN has also highlighted proliferation concerns surrounding Iran’s energy sector, and all companies must be conscious of the implications of any trade they conduct with Iran’s energy companies.

We know that officials in Iran have been anxious about this new round of sanctions. If the Iranian Government holds true to form, it will scramble to identify “work-arounds” – hiding behind front companies, doctoring wire transfers, falsifying shipping documents. We will continue to expose this deception thereby reinforcing the very reasons why the private sector is increasingly shunning Iran.

We will also work to ensure international sanctions are enforced. In this regard, the State Department has dedicated a senior official, Bob Einhorn, to ensure that we accomplish this in cooperation with our friends and partners around the world. We are fortunate to have someone of Bob’s stature and experience working on this issue.

The overall result of these efforts is that Iran’s choice will become increasingly clear – to choose the path offered by President Obama and the international community or to remain on a course that leads to further isolation.

PS-Prep is a partnership between DHS and the private sector that enables private entities to receive emergency preparedness certification from a DHS accreditation system created in coordination with the private sector.

The standards—developed by the National Fire Protection Association, the British Standards Institution and ASIS International—were published for public comment in the Federal Register in Oct. 2009. The adoption of the final standards was published in a Federal Register notice today following a series of regional public meetings and the incorporation of public comments.

Secretary Napolitano said:

“Private organizations across the country—from businesses to universities to non-profit organizations—have a vital role to play in bolstering our disaster preparedness and response capabilities. These new standards will provide our private sector partners with the tools they need to enhance the readiness and resiliency of our nation.”

DHS will continue to accept comments on PS-Prep, the three adopted standards, and/or proposals to adopt any other similar standard that satisfies the target criteria of the December 2008 Federal Register notice which announced the program.

“It’s clear that Americans, especially those who live along the affected areas of the Gulf Coast, are frustrated with the response of both BP and the Obama Administration. I believe that the Administration should immediately convene a task force of national and international government and private sector engineering, environmental, and oil industry experts to explore every possible means to halt the gushing oil flow and to protect the fragile marshes, barrier islands, and coastlines.”

“Every day the Administration delays is another lost opportunity to find solutions. BP appears to lack the equipment and know-how to deal with this disaster and did not plan for this worst-case scenario. I am extremely concerned that the advent of the hurricane season will further imperil the Gulf Coast states.”

Oil spill cleanup by the numbers to date (Photo Credits – courtesy of PhotoStudio.org):

• SBA has approved 36 economic injury assistance loans to date, totaling $1,257,000, for small businesses in Louisiana impacted by the BP oil spill. Additionally, the agency has granted deferments on 272 existing SBA disaster loans in the Gulf Coast region, totaling $1,123,300 per month in payments.
• 17 staging areas are in place and ready to protect sensitive shorelines, including: Dauphin Island, Ala., Orange Beach, Ala., Theodore, Ala., Panama City, Fla., Pensacola, Fla., Port St. Joe, Fla., St. Marks, Fla., Amelia, La., Cocodrie, La., Grand Isle, La., Shell Beach, La., Slidell, La., St. Mary, La.; Venice, La., Biloxi, Miss., Pascagoula, Miss., and Pass Christian, Miss.
• More than 20,000 personnel are currently responding to protect the shoreline and wildlife and cleanup vital coastlines.
• More than 1,900 vessels are responding on site, including skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels to assist in containment and cleanup efforts—in addition to dozens of aircraft, remotely operated vehicles, and multiple mobile offshore drilling units.
• The administration has authorized 17,500 National Guard troops from Gulf Coast states to participate in the response to the BP oil spill.
• Approximately 2 million feet of containment boom and 2.3 million feet of sorbent boom have been deployed to contain the spill—and approximately 745,000 feet of containment boom and 2.1 million feet of sorbent boom are available.
• Approximately 15 million gallons of an oil-water mix have been recovered.
• Approximately 1.02 million gallons of total dispersant have been deployed—765,000 on the surface and 255,000 subsea. More than 450,000 gallons are available.
• 125 controlled burns have been conducted, efficiently removing a total of more than 3.2 million gallons of oil from the open water in an effort to protect shoreline and wildlife.

Here are the report’s conclusions:

Given the number of passengers that travel on cruise ships each year and the attractiveness of these vessels as terrorist targets, it is important that the risk to cruise ships is assessed and actions are taken to help ensure the security of these ships and their facilities. Federal agencies and maritime security stakeholders, including cruise lines, have implemented various measures to better secure cruise ships and their facilities. As examples, the Coast Guard provides escorts for cruise ships to prevent waterside attacks and CBP screens passengers using manifest data to prevent terrorists from boarding cruise ships. Although these measures have been implemented and there has been no recent credible terrorist threat against cruise ships, this does not preclude the possibility of such an incident occurring in the future, particularly given the existence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship. Moreover, the President’s 2010 memorandum directing DHS to aggressively pursue enhanced screening efforts further underscores the potential importance of this type of security action. By conducting a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide automated Passenger Name Record data on a systematic basis is cost effective and addresses privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security through enhanced screening of cruise ship passengers.

Click here to view full version of the report.

Click here to view coming maritime security events.