The world’s demand for LNG is increasing dramatically, since this energy source is available abundantly, ready to meet global energy demand at a time of rising energy prices. A recent HSRC’s report Global LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Infrastructure Security Market 2009 - 2014 forecasts that over the next few years we will witness rapid development of the global LNG infrastructure. For instance, the total number of LNG terminals worldwide will nearly triple over the next 7 years. This growth will be accompanied by a robust growth in the LNG infrastructure security market. The report’s forecasts:

• Surging energy prices will drive heavy investments in LNG infrastructure and its security – over $600 Billion and $17 Billion respectively in the next 6 years
• Over 300 new LNG facilities will be built over the next 6 years
• Over 75% of the LNG market is outside of the US
• Perimeter security & Maritime security account for over 30% of the market

Chairman Lieberman; Senator Collins. Distinguished Members.
Violent extremism is a major problem in a number of contemporary societies; violent Islamist extremism has become a serious global threat, and could remain so during the next few decades. In order to more effectively thwart this threat, it is necessary to explore and better understand its roots. For this reason, I am grateful to you for inviting me to present my views regarding the ideological roots of violent Islamist extremism.
Because ideology is a major focus in this hearing, let me begin by clarifying my own ideological biases. Like hundreds of millions of other Muslims, my hope and goal is that Islamic societies, including those of the Near and Middle East, will become far more politically, culturally, and economically open in the future. The open, democratic Islamic society will be more peaceful, more productive, more affluent, more just, and better for the global economy. To a significant degree, higher oil prices are the result of dictatorships, monopolies, corruption, a lack of open competition, and inefficiency.
But to achieve more open Islamic societies there are major obstacles to overcome, and violent Islamist extremism is one such major obstacle. In order to evaluate this particular obstacle, I find it instructive to review the letter of invitation I received, which states the purpose of the present Senate hearing to be “to explore the ideology that is the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world”. I believe it is useful to critically assess the assumption that an ideology is “the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world”.
An ideology does not arise in a vacuum, nor does it influence behavior in a vacuum. An ideology can only impact behavior under given conditions, when other necessary factors are present.
In the Georgetown University libraries, there are many books that espouse potentially dangerous ideologies. Why is it that young women and men at Georgetown are not influenced by the many dangerous books available, including works on fascism, anarchism, and various kinds of religious fundamentalism? Why do they not turn to terrorism? Clearly because the availability of a violent extremist ideology serves as a necessary, but is not a sufficient, cause for terrorist action.
We must ask, then, what are the factors that combine with a particular ideology to lead to violent Islamist extremism? How does an ideology supportive of violent Islamist extremism come to influence individuals to support and commit acts of terrorism? I have addressed this question by adopting a ‘big picture’ approach1, exploring radicalization and terrorism in the context of cultural evolution and globalization. In order to clarify my viewpoint, I have found it useful to adopt a staircase metaphor of radicalization and terrorism.

The Staircase To Terrorism
Consider a multi-story building with a winding staircase at its center. People are located on different floors of the building, but everyone begins on the ground floor; where there are about 1.2 billion Muslims. Thought and action on each floor is characterized by particular psychological processes. On the ground floor, the most important psychological processes influencing behavior are subjective interpretations of material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity. Hundreds of millions of Muslims suffer collective (fraternal) relative deprivation and lack of adequate identity; they feel that they are not being treated fairly and are not receiving adequate material rewards. They feel dissatisfied with the way they are depicted by the international media and, most importantly, they do not want to become second-class copies of Western ideals.
I have argued that the Islamic population on the ground floor of the staircase to terrorism is experiencing a collective identity crisis, and that this crisis is particularly acute in the major dictatorships of the Near and Middle East. Muslims are faced with a choice between two inadequate identities. The first involves copying the West, and confronts what I have termed ‘the good copy problem’. By copying the West, Muslims can only hope to become ‘good copies’ of borrowed Western ideals, but not to achieve authentic identities. The second path open to Muslims for identity development is represented by various kinds of Islamic fundamentalism, which push for a return to ‘pure’ Islam in the form it is assumed to have existed 1,400 years ago. Why is there not a third alternative, a constructive secular third path? The reason is that dictatorial, authoritarian forces continue to imprison, banish, or kill the secular opposition. In country after country in the Near and Middle East, as well as in parts of central and North Africa, Islamic fundamentalism is filling the enormous vacuum left open by the despotic repression of democratic movements.
This situation has resulted in a collective crisis of identity among Muslims. This identity crisis is especially acute because about 60% of the global Muslim population is below the age of 25, and because the psychological experiences of the young are characterized by a yearning for adequate identity.
However, on the ground floor, degrees of freedom are large relative to degrees of freedom2 on the higher floors of the staircase to terrorism, and individual Muslims on the ground floor have a wider range of behavioral options. Only some individuals move up from the ground floor to the first floor, in search of ways to improve their life conditions. These individuals in no way see themselves as terrorists or even supportive of terrorist causes; they are simply attempting to improve the situation of themselves and their groups. On this floor they are particularly influenced by possibilities for individual mobility and voice. Extensive evidence has accumulated to show that when people feel their voice is listened to during the decision making process, they ‘buy into’ the system. However, when they feel they have no voice, they become more dissatisfied and detached. Some of these dissatisfied individuals climb up to the second floor of the staircase, where they come under the influence of persuasive messages telling them that the root cause of their problems is external enemies, particularly America and Israel. Individuals on the second floor are encouraged to displace aggression onto external targets.
Displacement of aggression is a well documented phenomenon in inter-group dynamics in both non-Western and Western societies. By focusing attention on so-called ‘external enemies’, those who oppose openness and democracy find it easier to:

*increase support for aggressive leadership
*silence internal critics and dissenting voices
*isolate and pressure minorities
*gain public support for trampling on civil liberties and human rights

Many of the individuals who climb up to the second floor of the staircase remain there, but some keep climbing up to reach the third floor where they adopt a morality supportive of terrorism. Gradually, those who have reached the third floor become divorced from the mainstream morality of their society, which generally condemns terrorism (this is also true in Islamic communities), and take on a morality supportive of an ‘ends justify the means’ approach. Those individuals who continue the climb up to the fourth floor adopt a more rigid style of categorical ‘us versus them’, ‘good against evil’ thinking. Their world is now unambiguously divided up into ‘black and white’, and it is seen as legitimate to attack ‘the forces of evil’ in any and every way feasible. Some of these individuals move up to the fifth floor, where they take part in and directly support terrorist actions.
Individuals who reach the highest floors of the staircase become specialized in their activities in support of terrorism. Through an analysis of the available evidence, I identified nine different specialties involved in terrorist activities and networks. Both the research literature and the media typically focuses on the suicide bomber, a specialty that belongs to a category I have termed ‘fodder’. The eight other specialties are: source of inspiration, strategist, networker, technical expert, cell manager, local agitator and guide, local cell member, and fund raiser. Some of these specialties are more involved with the production and dissemination of ideology, while others tend to be consumers of ideology.
The higher individuals move up the staircase to terrorism, the lower the degrees of freedom. In other words, the power of the context increases, and the behavioral options decrease, on the higher floors. After an individual has become part of a terrorist group or network and has reached the highest floor, the only options left open are to try to kill, or be killed or captured. Personality factors are less influential, and the context is all-powerful, on the highest floor. In contrast, on the lowest floors the degrees of freedom are greater, meaning that individuals have a wider variety of behavioral options, and personality factors play a larger role in determining who climbs up the staircase.
The varying nature of degrees of freedom is evident in all situations where terrorism has existed. Consider the context of Northen Ireland. When I visited Belfast to conduct interviews in the 1970s, it was like walking through a war zone. For example, the offices of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) were in a fortress building, surrounded by sandbags and barbed wire. There was tremendous pressure within both Catholic and Protestant groups to conform to ingroup norms, and not only to maintain a distance from the outgroup but to condone acts of terrorism against the outgroup. This was a situation of low degrees of freedom. Northern Ireland in 2008 is a very different place, where the normative system opposes terrorism and degrees of freedom are far greater. In this transformed 21st century context, individual characteristics will be more influential in determining which individuals participate in and support terrorism.

The Distance-Traveled Hypothesis
I now turn my attention to Muslims in the United States and in Europe, to consider specifically the issue of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. Clearly, the relatively open nature of Western societies and the global reach of electronic technology and the world wide web means that the ideology of violent Islamist extremism is available to Muslims in the United States, as it is available in Europe. However, because of a variety of other factors, Islamic terrorism will be a greater threat in Europe, at least for the next few decades. The most important of these other factors are briefly discussed below.
*The ‘distance-traveled hypothesis’3 proposes that the distance immigrants have to travel in order to settle in a host country determines the (material, educational, and other) resources needed to succeed in the migration. Muslims need to have greater resources to move from the Middle East and North Africa to settle in the United States, than they do to settle in Europe. The greater resources of American Muslims in part explains the greater success of Muslims in the United States, particularly in terms of economic and educational attainment, relative to Muslims in Europe.
*Muslims arriving in the United States have had the resources, including in terms of values, needed to integrate into a competitive, open market system. The openness of the American system and the ‘American dream, anyone can make it here’ belief system has worked well for Muslims in America. The only serious exception I see to this is the potential for violent Islamist extremism taking root in U.S. prisons, among individuals who become convinced they are being unjustly treated because of their group membership, they have no voice, and no hope for a better future.
*The situation of the approximately 20 million Muslims in Europe is more problematic. First, the largest groups of Muslims in Europe (South Asians in the UK, North Africans in France, Turks in Germany) have lower levels of important resources (income, educational attainment, and so on) compared to the local population. Second, these Muslims are geographically closer to major centers of violent Islamist extremist ideology (e.g., Pakistan). Third, the major European countries are confronted by enormous challenges integrating Muslims, who tend to live in collective segregation. Anyone who wants to confirm this only has to walk through South Asian neighborhoods in major cities in England, or North African neighborhoods in major cities in France, or Turkish neighborhoods in major cities in Germany. Fourth, European countries are experimenting with a muddled array of integration strategies, from extreme assimilation, the washing away of intergroup differences (“Immigrants must become French”) to relativistic multiculturalism, the highlighting, strengthening, and celebration of intergroup differences (“Sharia law can be implemented in Muslim homes”).
*In both North America and in Europe, more constructive policies must be developed to manage diversity. There are serious flaws in the current policies, both of the assimilation and multiculturalism varieties.4 The ‘third way’ alternative I advocate is omniculturalism, which involves using a foundation of psychological universals and human commonalities as a launching pad for valuing distinct identities. The end point of omniculturalism is a society whose members first recognize the importance of their common similarities and bonds, and on the basis of this ‘common’ foundation recognize and uphold the value of distinct local identities. In omniculturalism, the celebration of intergroup commonalities serve as a stepping stone to the celebration and sharing of intergroup differences.
*A policy of omniculturalism focuses particularly on transforming the economic, political, and cultural role of Muslim women, ensuring their equal progress and participation in the public sphere. Through the transformation of the role of Muslim women, relationships, roles, and socialization practices within the Muslim family will be changed to support open, democratic societies. The healthy family is the basis for the healthy society.
In exploring the ideological roots of violent Islamist extremism in the global context, it is vital to consider the active role Western societies should play. In particular, the United States has global responsibilities that must not be neglected. The final part of my statement addresses this key issue.

The “New Global American Dilemma”5
In a study of race-relations in the United States published under the title of An American Dilemma (1944),6 the brilliant Swedish researcher Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987) accurately identified the first American dilemma. He pointed out that even after the official end of slavery in the United States, there continued to be a contradiction between, on the one hand the American rhetoric of freedom and liberty, and on the other hand the discriminatory mistreatment of African Americans. As we know, this historic dilemma was eventually resolved in favor of freedom and equality of opportunity through legislative and societal reform. There now looms a second historic dilemma confronting America, one that is global and demands a resolution.
The new global American dilemma arises out of the contradiction existing between American support for, on the one hand, so-called ‘friendly’ dictatorships in the Near and Middle East and, on the other hand, the right of all Muslims to live in open, democratic societies. The new global American dilemma is not ‘Democratic’ or ‘Republican’ or ‘Independent’ in political affiliation, it confronts all Americans and will have to be resolved through unified effort.
The rhetoric of “freedom, equality of opportunity, and democracy for all” emanating from the White House over the last few decades has had a powerful impact on two groups in the Near and Middle East. First, the vast majority of Muslims, and Muslim intellectuals in particular, immediately recognized the basic contradiction between the ‘democracy and freedom’ rhetoric of the United States, and the actual practice of continued support for certain dictatorships in the region. The vast majority of Muslims recognize that it is through American support that certain dictatorships in the Near and Middle East continue to crush secular opposition groups, and prevent women and other minorities from gaining greater freedom and equality. A second group influenced by the ‘democracy and freedom’ rhetoric of American political leaders are Islamic Fundamentalists, who are fearful of any change that gives greater freedom to ordinary people, particularly women. Islamic fundamentalists have generally adopted an ‘anti-progress, anti-democracy’ position.
But why, then, do Islamic fundamentalists manage to gain sympathy and on some issues even some support from many Muslims, in both Western and non-Western societies? Given the moderate positions of most Muslims, why would they sympathize with fundamentalists at least on some issues? The new global American dilemma is at the heart of this puzzle. Four related facts must be kept in mind. First, the U.S. and its allies continue to support certain corrupt dictatorships in the Near and Middle East. Second, dictatorships in the Near and Middle East refuse to allow the growth of secular, democratic opposition groups. Third, the only avenue open for collective activism in the Near and Middle East is the mosque - no dictator has the power to close mosques, although all dictators attempt to control what happens in mosques. Fourth, fundamentalists use the mosque, and religious traditions broadly, to position themselves as the vanguard of opposition to so-called ‘pro-American’ dictatorships. This is exactly what happened in Iran in the late 1970s, and in Algeria in the 1980s, and in a number of Islamic countries more recently. The threat of fundamentalist groups is real and imminent in Egypt, Pakistan, and some other major Islamic societies.
Finally, as a psychologist I am aware that the new global American dilemma is increasing cognitive tensions among Americans. The United States should not and will not shrink from its global responsibilities. Increasing globalization means that the American public is becoming more aware of the contradiction between American rhetorical support for freedom, equality of opportunity, and democracy, and American practices in support of dictatorships in certain Muslim countries. The history of American values will force a resolution to this dilemma, inevitably in favor of support for democracy rather than dictatorship.
Just as democracy in America is different from democracy in the United Kingdom, which is different from democracy in France, which is different from democracy in Germany, and so on, democracy in Iraq will evolve to be different from democracy in Pakistan, which will be different from democracy in Saudi Arabia, which will be different from democracy in Egypt, and so on. Contextualized democracy7 will eventually evolve in all Muslim countries, as it has in the West.

Concurrent with this sharp increase in domestic insecurity in Pakistan has been the apparent resurgence on that country’s territory of the very threat the United States has sought to neutralize in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda and affiliated groups who continue to plot anti-Western terrorist attacks. Despite years of effort and billions of dollars worth of resources, the estimated number of Al Qaeda suspects reported killed or captured in Pakistan - around 700 - has remained essentially unchanged since 2004. At an April 2008 House hearing on Al Qaeda, a panel of non-governmental experts agreed that the ongoing hunt for Al Qaeda’s top leaders was foundering. At the m e time, however, the head of the U.S. Central Intelligence- Agency, Michael Hayden, later portrayed A1 Qaeda as being on the defensive in South Asia, claiming that its leadership is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Muslim world. Yet Hayden’s conclusion came only two months after his March 2008 assertion that the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border “presents a clew and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular.” He agreed with other top U.S. officials who believe that possible future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland likely would likely originate in that region.

Full copy of Addressing the U.S .-Pakistan Strategic Relationship statement is available here.

Please vote below, answer will be released on June 25th.

Here is the answer.

The total system is now being implemented in the arms storage facility. Various forms of wireless tags are placed on the different types of armament. The items’ electronic identifications are enrolled in the software to provide an automatic, real time inventory of each armament and its location based on its transmitted signal. Any unauthorized movement of an armament outside the storage area, automatically triggers an alert. The handling of armaments can be linked to authorized service personnel electronically via an RFID personnel badge so the authorized movement does not trigger an alert. Sensor based tags can also be deployed to report on environmental conditions to which the ordnance is exposed, such as temperature, humidity and shock.

The system is based on the Dot, small, powerful, low cost battery-powered wireless system-on-a-chip (SOC) computer.

ScanPort was conceived in response to the U.S. Army’s request for a system to manage people screening at standoff locations as a prerequisite for entrance to secured military bases. The military’s extreme outdoor locations posed a challenge in deploying screening technology in a way that achieved standoff, remote monitoring, and detected improvised explosive device (IED) suicide bombs on the body and in hand carried baggage without endangering security personnel. Brijot met the challenge by introducing a container concept that is quickly deployed, screens people and baggage, and provides a platform to emplace other advanced force protection technologies.

ScanPort consists of a standard 20-foot ISO shipping container that contains two GEN 2 whole body imaging systems, providing simultaneous front and back real-time screening and concealed object detection. ScanPort is equipped as a fully automated access control system with electronically locked entry and exit doors operated by programmable logic control (PLC), air conditioning, lighting, and an X-ray baggage scanner. The nerve center for ScanPort is a customized Security Operations Center that is monitored remotely at a safe distance from imminent threats.

Bottom picture: Brijot ScanPort (exterior view) is an engineered solution that optimizes passive millimeter wave technology to achieve a portable people screening solution for the detection of IEDs.

Here are the documents:

• Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information
• Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
• Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq

Versa Power Systems, Inc., a developer of Solid Oxide Fuel Cells (SOFC), has been selected to work with Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems to develop power generating unit for an ultra-long endurance unmanned aircraft. Solid oxide fuel cells are particularly “power dense,” generating considerably large amounts of electricity from a relatively low-weight package. They produce energy continuously as long as the basic building blocks of fuel and air are supplied. Fuel cells consist of few moving parts, increasing their reliability over many other choices that might be considered for generating energy in a long-endurance aircraft.

High Altitude Long Endurance Systems are intended to provide uninterrupted intelligence-gathering and assured communications over a fixed area for extended times.

More Information on High Altitude Long Endurance Systems:
Unmanned Aerial Systems Becoming More Like Satellites
Air Force Shuns Near Space Missions
Expendable Stratospheric Platforms

Full text of the report is available here.

Full text of the report is available here

The United States Border Patrol (USBP) deploys fencing, which aims to impede the illegal entry of individuals, and vehicle barriers, which aim to impede the illegal entry of vehicles (but not individuals) along the border. The USBP first began erecting barriers in 1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector. The ensuing 14 mile-long San Diego “primary fence” formed part of the USBP’s “Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order to deter would-be migrants from entering the country. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which, among other things, explicitly gave the Attorney General (now the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) broad authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the construction of a secondary layer of fencing to buttress the completed 14 mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled due to environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act that authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements in order to expedite the construction of border barriers. DHS has announced it will use this waiver authority to complete the San Diego fence. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 directed DHS to construct 850 miles of additional border fencing. This requirement was subsequently modified by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which was enacted into law on December 26, 2007. The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct fencing along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border.

While the San Diego fence, combined with an increase in agents and other resources in the USBP’s San Diego sector, has proven effective in reducing the number of apprehensions made in that sector, there is considerable evidence that the flow of illegal immigration has adapted to this enforcement posture and has shifted to the more remote areas of the Arizona desert. Nationally, the USBP made 1.2 million apprehensions in 1992 and again in 2004, suggesting that the increased enforcement in San Diego sector has had little impact on overall apprehensions. In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary vehicle barriers to the border. Temporary vehicle barriers are typically chained together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP’s discretion. Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to remain in one location.

A number of policy issues concerning border barriers generally and fencing specifically may be of interest to Congress, including, but not limited, to their effectiveness, costs versus benefits, location, design, environmental impact, potential diplomatic ramifications, and the costs of acquiring the land needed for construction.